Engberg et al. (1) reported performance differences among three groups of pigeons in an autoshaping situation. The important variable was the prior experience these groups had received: One group learned to press a treadle for grain reinforcement before autoshaping began (treadle group); a second group received an equal number of reinforcements on a noncontingent basis (hopper group); and a third group effectively received no prior treatment (control group). The hopper group required the greatest median number of trials to reach a learning criterion; the control group, an intermediate number; and the treadle group, the smallest number. An analysis of variance revealed that the three groups were not drawn from the same population. The authors discussed their findings in terms of "learned laziness" and possibly learned "industriousness." We wish to comment on two aspects of this report.
Let us first consider the findings themselves. Although reliable differences among the three groups were reported, pairwise comparisons based on the authors' published data were disappointing. The small difference between the treadle group and the control group was not significant (Mann-Whitney U = 23, P > .10; t = 0.862, P > .20). We feel that the number of subjects involved in this study is sufficiently large to reveal major effects; our intuitive scan of the data-independent of formal statistical analysis-does not lead us to believe that the data were suggestive of a real effect. Thus, the question of whether training on The treatment appears to induce both "learned brilliance" and "learned stupidity."
In the case of the "learned helplessness phenomenon" (6), the possibility of specific transfer effects due to response learning was examined experimentally and rejected (7), and it may be that the "helplessness" effects reported in dogs do in fact reflect an altered state of the organism. Engberg et al. did not report comparable tests, and their generalization therefore seems premature.
In shifting to inferences about the state of the organism, the experimental burden is expanded in still another way, because the question of what is learned must be addressed at a level of analysis far removed from the specifics of behavior. Thus, in discussing the logic of the concept of "helplessness," Rachlin (8) pointed out that the designation "learned omnipotence" might be applied with equal propriety, on the basis of experimental evidence. A similar point can be made here: Perhaps the pigeon has learned to anticipate that anything he does may produce food ("omnipotence") rather than to anticipate "a continuation of the noncontingency" by which action has no consequences at all ("learned laziness"). We do not wish to take a position on the relative merits of these two interpretations-we simply wish to emphasize that organismic concepts require a far more extended experimental and theoretical program than behavioristic concepts do, if appropriate standards of scientific inference are to be maintained.
Because of the greater demands of establishing such concepts, considerable care is required in the naming of them. restricted to the relation (or lack of one) between their behavior and grain deliveries. When birds were placed in mation" conveyed by key illuminations with respect to grain deliveries was operationally equal for all three experimental groups in our study. Gamzu et al. reject our "organismic" (that is, cognitive) interpretation of our data, invoking instead the principles of "response competition" and stimulus and response similarity in transfer of training. First of all, the treadle group was explicitly trained to make a response that could compete with keypecking. Gamzu et al. (1) argue that removal of the treadle during autoshaping most likely eliminated the source of stimulus control over treadlepressing, and, as a consequence, the explicitly conditioned competing responses (treadle-pressing movements and body orientations toward the previous treadle location) were no longer probable during autoshaping. However, such responses occasionally were observed in autoshape training, but the treadle group acquired key-pecking most rapidly.
Gamzu et al. suggest that superstitious behavior may have developed in our hopper group which would persist into autoshape training and interfere with key-peck acquisition. They refer to a most informative paper by Staddon and Simmelhag (5) , who reported "nonarbitrary" superstitious behaviors developing under conditions similar to those employed in initial training for our hopper group. The response topoggraphies most frequently occurring in "terminal" superstitious responding were facing and pecking at the magazine wall. It seems reasonable to expect that such behaviors would facilitate rather than impede the acquisition of key-pecking, as the pigeons would have been positioned so as to receive maximal visual stimulation by the key illuminations and would already be experienced with pecking at objects other than grain in the general locale of the response key. The hopper group, however, was slowest in acquiring keypecking.
We agree with Gamzu et al. that ours was a transfer design and that the role of stimulus and response similarity should be considered. Theoretically, maximal positive transfer should occur when both stimuli and responses in pretraining and test situations are highly similar (6) . If we assume that our hopper subjects acquired superstitious behaviors similar to those observed by Staddon and Simmelhag, then the condition of high stimulus and response similarity was more closely approximated for the hopper than for the treadle group. In the latter, an important stimulus element (the treadle) was removed, and the measured response of key-pecking was very different from that explicitly trained in the previous stage. The fact that the treadle group performed the best and the hopper group the worst suggests to us that a peripheralistic stimulus-response transfer analysis of these results is necessarily inadequate. In addition, stimulus and response similarity are typically evoked analytically under experimental conditions in which contingencies of reinforcement are similar for the two stages of a transfer design. Transfer from a condition of explicitly defined contingencies to one of no experimenter-defined contingency in our treadle group obviously complicates application of this interpretation.
The principal difficulty with response ccmpetition interpretations is that competing responses are often invoked post hoc and neither observed nor measured. As such they can "account for" facilitation or impairment in transfer tasks and still have no predictive value. In the absence of an account of the compatibility relations among response topographies in the pigeon, the concept of competing responses does not seem a priori preferable to those of "learned laziness" or "industriousness." The preference of Gamzu et al. for a response competition interpretation seems to reflect a peripheralistic ideological commitment and is not compelled by the data.
With regard to the use of the term "learned laziness," it was our intention to emphasize the relation between our results and those designated "learned helplessness" (7) . The term was used in a descriptive sense only. Further, our interpretation does not require additional concepts such as "learned brilliance" and "learned stupidity." We assume that both the hopper and treadle groups learned something about the relation between their behavior and grain deliveries. The hopper group learned that grain deliveries were not dependent on their behavior, whereas the treadle group learned that food delivery was dependent upon their be- 
